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The First Amendment severely limits the government's ability to
prohibit disfavored speech, but does not impose similar constraints on the
government's ability to craft its own message. Such a distinction makes
sense. One of the purposes of the First Amendment is to prevent the
government from muzzling those who are critical of it.' However, the
government is not required to be neutral on all matters of concern merely
because it must permit others to be critical.2 Prohibiting the government as
a speaker from favoring one message over another would, as a practical
matter, preclude the government from speaking at all-an untenable result.3
Regrettably, the United States Supreme Court has not offered helpful
criteria to determine when the government is acting as speaker rather than
as regulator. Unless the Court clarifies this matter, we can only expect a
more confused jurisprudence and an increasing number of instances in
which the circuit courts will treat relevantly similar cases differently.
Part II of this Article describes the evolution of the government speech
doctrine, noting the ways in which the Court has left the doctrine
uncabined. Part III examines an understandable attempt by a circuit court
* Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio.
1. Cf Mark G. Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Government
Expression and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 863, 897 (1979) ("One purpose of the first
amendment is to prevent government censorship of private speech, particularly political speech,
through the operation of laws.") (emphasis added).
2. Cf W. Bradley Wendel, "Certain Fundamental Truths": A Dialectic on Negative and
Positive Liberty in Hate-Speech Cases, 65 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 42-43 (2002) ("The
government can fund a public education campaign that says, 'Wear your seatbelt,' or 'Quit
smoking now,' or 'Don't have unprotected sex.' It doesn't have to remain agnostic in public
about whether or not wearing a seatbelt is a good idea.").
3. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting)
("To govern, government has to say something, and a First Amendment heckler's veto of any
forced contribution to raising the government's voice in the 'marketplace of ideas' would be out
of the question.").
[37]
to limit the government speech doctrine, and explains both that the
limitation offered ignores controlling precedent and that another circuit has
illustrated some of the dangers posed by the current doctrine. This Article
concludes that the Court must offer meaningful limitations on what can be
characterized as government speech before that exception swallows up
many of the protections offered by the First Amendment.
I. Government Speech Doctrine
The government speech jurisprudence is underdeveloped, because it is
of recent vintage and there are relatively few cases relying on or
explicating that doctrine.4 Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court
has upheld particular practices as government speech in a few different
cases without offering an account of the conditions under which the
government may claim particular expression as its own and thereby
avoiding First Amendment speech limitations. Precisely because the
government is subject to substantial constraint when regulating speech, but
very little constraint when acting as speaker,5 the Court must clearly
articulate the conditions under which the government is entitled to the
greater freedoms associated with its acting as speaker rather than regulator.
A. Rust and the Government Speech Doctrine
Rust v. Sullivan6 is characterized as one of the first government speech
cases, 7 although the case was not so understood at the time it was issuedt
and, indeed, the term "government speech" was not contained in the
4. See id. at 574 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The government-speech doctrine is relatively
new, and correspondingly imprecise."); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481
(2009) (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing the "recently minted government speech doctrine").
5. First Amendment-Freedom of Speech-Government Speech-Walker v. Texas Div.,
Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 129 HARV. L. REV. 221 (2015) ("The Supreme Court's
government speech doctrine offers a constitutional escape hatch-a means by which government
and courts may disregard the boundaries that the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment
would otherwise impose.").
6. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
7. Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental,
83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 612 (2008) ("The 1991 Rust v. Sullivan decision is now heralded as one
of the first government speech cases.").
8. William M. Carter, Jr., Affirmative Action as Government Speech, 59 UCLA L. REv. 2,
33 n.162 (2011) ("While the Rust Court did not use the term government speech in its analysis,
the Court has subsequently pointed to Rust as the genesis of the government speech doctrine.");
Alana C. Hake, The States, a Plate, and the First Amendment: The "Choose Life" Specialty
License Plate as Government Speech, 85 WASH. U. L. REv. 409, 422 (2007) ("Although the
decision did not contain the words 'government speech,' Rust v. Sullivan has been recognized
subsequently as the 'fountainhead' of that doctrine.").
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opinion.9 In Rust, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a controversial
federal statute preventing clinics from receiving certain federal funds from
engaging in abortion-related activities.'o The prohibited activities included
both discussing abortion and providing abortion referrals." If a patient
were to ask for such a referral, she could be told that "the project does not
consider abortion an appropriate method of family planning and therefore
does not counsel or refer for abortion." 2 The physician was prohibited
from making this referral.13
When holding that the regulation did not violate constitutional
guarantees, the Rust Court was less clear than might have been desired
about why the limitation passed constitutional muster. 14 The Court
explained that "the Government [was] not denying a benefit to anyone,
but. . . instead simply insisting that public funds be spent for the purposes
for which they were authorized."' 5  That explanation suggested that the
government has great discretion with respect to the projects that it chooses
to fund. "The Government can, without violating the Constitution,
selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be
in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative
program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way."' 6 The
government's choosing one way rather than another to address a particular
problem does not entail that the government has "discriminated on the basis
of viewpoint."' 7  Instead, the Court explained that the government "has
merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other."
Rust might be thought to stand for the proposition that the government
may impose whatever conditions it desires on government-funded
9. Corbin, supra note 7, at 612 ("[T]he term 'government speech' appeared nowhere in the
decision.").
10. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 178-80.
11. Id. at 179.
12. Id. at 180 (citing FTC Credit Practices Rule, 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(5) (2016)).
13. Elliot Mincberg, A Look at Recent Supreme Court Decisions: Judicial Prior Restraint
and the First Amendment, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 878 (1993) ("Doctors could refer women to
pre-natal services, or to gynecological services, but could not refer them to abortion-related
services, indicating the improper viewpoint-based nature of the Rust rule.").
14. See R. George Wright, Managing the Distinction Between Government Speech and
Private Party Speech, 34 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 347, 348 (2016) ("The importance of the
government speech versus private party speech distinction has not, however, been matched by its
clarity.").
15. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991).
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projects.1 9 However, the Supreme Court has clarified that the government
does not have unfettered discretion when imposing limitations on those
whom it funds.20 In addition, the Court has offered a different way to
understand Rust.2 1
In Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia,22 the
Court explained that "the government [is permitted] to regulate the content
of what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker or when it enlists
private entities to convey its own message." 2 3  Focusing on Rust in
particular, the Rosenberger Court noted that It had "upheld the
government's prohibition on abortion-related advice applicable to
recipients of federal funds for family planning counseling," 24 and then
explained that "the government did not create a program to encourage
private speech but instead used private speakers to transmit specific
information pertaining to its own program." 25 Rosenberger's suggestion
that Rust was a government speech rather than a government funding case
was echoed in Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin System v.
Southworth,2 6  where the Court suggested that Rust involved "the
government's right ... to use its own funds to advance a particular
message."2 7
Merely because government speech is not subject to First Amendment
restrictions, 2 8other than those provided by the Establishment Clause,2 9 does
not mean that citizens disagreeing with the government's message are
without recourse. "When the government speaks ... to promote its own
19. See Joel Gora, The Calm After the Storm: First Amendment Cases in the Supreme
Court's 2000-2001 Term, 18 TOURO L. REv. 29, 45 (2001) ("The Supreme Court upheld the
restriction in Rust in a five-to-four decision on the theory that 'he who pays the piper calls the
tune.'").
20. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (striking down limitations on
the arguments that Legal Services Corporation attorneys could make on behalf of their clients).
21. Cf Kristi L. Bowman, The Government Speech Doctrine and Speech in Schools, 48
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 211, 231 (2013) ("[[]n Rust v. Sullivan, which is commonly described as
the first major government speech case, the government regulated what doctors could say to
patients in family planning programs via a Spending Clause restriction.").
22. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
23. Id. at 833.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
27. Id. at 229.
28. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005) ("[T]he Government's
own speech ... is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.").
29. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 460-61 (2009) ("[G]overnment speech
must comport with the Establishment Clause.").
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policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the
electorate and the political process for its advocacy." 30 Thus, the electorate
can articulate its favored position by electing individuals whose views are
closer to its own, assuming that the electorate believes the point of
disagreement is sufficiently important.3 1 "If the citizenry objects, newly
elected officials later could espouse some different or contrary position." 32
Yet, the citizenry will not even know to object if it does not realize
that the government is speaking. Consider the doctors who were working
at the clinics receiving the Title X funds at issue in Rust.3 3 While the Court
treated the doctors as if they had been hired to deliver the government's
approved message, 3 4 it is not at all clear that the doctors could reasonably
be characterized as speaking for the government. The doctors had a
professional obligation to serve their patients' interests,35 and it would not
be difficult to imagine cases in which abortion was medically indicated.36
But the physicians might then be in the position of offering medical advice
that was contra-indicated.3 7 Further, the patients would not have
understood that the doctors were offering the government's position.3 8
30. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235.
31. Cf Eben Moglen & Pamela S. Karlan, The Soul of a New Political Machine: The
Online, the Color Line and Electronic Democracy, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1089, 1108 (2001)
(discussing the "disproportionate influence for single-issue voters who care about that issue").
32. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000).
33. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 177-78 (1991). ("These cases concern a facial challenge
to Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations which limit the ability of Title X
fund recipients to engage in abortion-related activities.").
34. Hake, supra note 8, at 423 ("[T]he Court treated the doctors as agents of the federal
government, private speakers conveying a governmental message.").
35. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 554 (2001) ("[T]he doctors in Rust had
a professional obligation to serve the interests of their patients.").
36. Robert A. Sedler, Abortion, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Constitution: The View
from Without and Within, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 529, 536 (1998)
(discussing "some circumstances where an abortion was 'medically indicated,' such as where it
was necessary to protect the pregnant woman's health").
37. That said, it is not as if the physicians continuing to work in the clinics would have been
unaware of this potential dilemma. See Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many
Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1392 (2001) ("[T]he doctors in the Title X
clinics were hired agents of the federal government, knew what they were hired to do, and knew
that the job required speaking the prescribed message which implemented the government's Title
X policy.").
38. Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983,
1050 (2005) ("[A] fundamental problem with the Rust decision is that the patients themselves did
not necessarily understand the doctors or other family planning counselors to be delivering a
governmental message."); Steven J. Heyman, State-Supported Speech, 1999 WiS. L. REV. 1119,
1166 (1999) ("[C]ounseling and referral are both offered and understood as services for the
benefit of the client, rather than as mere opportunities for the government or the clinic to present
their views.").
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Instead, the patients would likely believe that the doctors were offering
advice that was consistent with the doctors' professional obligation to
promote patient welfare. 3 9
The Court's finding that the doctors were speaking for the government
might have important implications for other kinds of cases. Justice Scalia
noted, "If the private doctors' confidential advice to their patients at issue
in Rust constituted 'government speech,' it is hard to imagine what
subsidized speech would not be government speech." 4 0  Indeed, unpaid
41
volunteers might speak for an organization, so it is not even clear that
payment would be required for an individual to be viewed as speaking for
42
the government.
The Court not only failed to specify criteria that would limit the times
when the government might claim certain speech as its own, 4 3 but the very
way that Rust came to be seen as a government speech case underscores
that doctrine's indeterminacy. When Rust was issued, commentators
tended to view it as a government funding case,44 (i.e., a case specifying the
39. Lee, supra note 38, at 1050 ("[I]t was highly likely that the patients understood the
doctors and counselors to be speaking independently, in accord with their professional training
and expertise.").
40. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 553, 554 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41. Cf Mark E. Chopko, Ascending Liability of Religious Entities for the Actions of Others,
17 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoC. 289, 331 (1993) ("If the minister, employee, or volunteer is acting in the
name of the religious community and is addressing matters on which that person is expected to
speak, liability often 'ascends' against the organization.").
42. Cf Kyle Langvardt, The Doctrinal Toll of "Information as Speech", 47 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 761, 789-90 (2016) ("At worst, the government could adopt essentially any private message
spoken in a public forum as its own 'government speech,' and thereby acquire the right to
suppress the private expression ofany conflicting viewpoint in the same space.").
43. Mark Strasser, Ignore the Man Behind the Curtain: On the Government Speech
Doctrine and What It Licenses, 21 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 85, 95 (2011) ("[T]he Rust-Velazquez line
of cases provides no clear criteria to determine when the First Amendment immunization of
government speech has been triggered.").
44. See Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., NEA v. Finley: A Decision in Search of a Rationale, 77
WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 15 (1999) ("Citing Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, Rust
v. Sullivan, and Maher v. Roe, the majority explained that the Government has wide discretion to
choose spending priorities or to engage in selective funding without discriminating on the basis of
viewpoint."); see also Stanley Ingber, Judging Without Judgment: Constitutional Irrelevancies
and the Demise of Dialogue, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1473, 1580 n.349 (1994) ("Rust speaks
generally to the lack of constitutional restraints on the government's selective use of its spending
power."); Byron V. Olsen, Rust in the Laboratory: When Science Is Censored, 58 ALB. L. REV.
299, 339 (1994) ("Courts must choose between making free speech interests the hostage of
federal conditional spending power, as brought forward with Rust and its predecessors, or
protecting speech from Congressional power, with the politically untenable necessity of
invalidating government sponsored attempts to control content through the public treasury.");
Lisa J. Allegrucci & Paul E. Kunz, The Future ofRoe v. Wade in the Supreme Court: Devolution
ofthe Right ofAbortion and Resurgence ofState Control, 7 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 295,
42 [Vol. 44:1
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conditions the government was permitted to impose if paying a program's
bills). After Rosenberger, Rust was understood differently4 5 -it was
retroactively changed into a government speech case4 6 (i.e., a case about
the constitutional limitations imposed on the Government when speaking).
This retroactive recharacterization is problematic in that it emphasizes
how easily particular communications can be characterized or, perhaps,
transformed into government speech. The ease with which this might
occur is underscored by the facts of Rust. The clinics were private. 47 There
were no signs indicating that the medical advice given in the clinic was
government speech,48 which meant that individuals receiving the medical
advice were not even on notice that the government was speaking.49
Rust illustrates some of the dangers associated with government
speech doctrine. It is difficult to cabin what counts as government speech
303 (1991) ("[1]n Rust v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court allowed the federal government to further
restrict a woman's right of abortion through its formidable spending power.").
45. Arthur N. Eisenberg, The Brooklyn Museum Controversy and the Issue of Government-
Funded Expression, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 275, 291 (2000) ("[T]he Court re-characterized the Rust
decision."); Cf Bowman, supra note 21, at 263 (discussing "the seminal government speech case
Rust v. Sullivan").
46. See David Cole, Faith and Funding: Toward an Expressivist Model of the
Establishment Clause, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 559, 589 (2002) ("The Rosenberger Court explained
that the leeway accorded the government in Rust does not apply to all government funding of
speech, but only to 'government speech,' that is, only where the government is hiring others to
express an official message."); see also David S. Udell, Implications of the Legal Services
Struggle for Other Government Grants for Lawyering for the Poor, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 895,
912 (1998) ("[T]he Rosenberger Court made clear that, in Rust, the conditions on speech were
permissible only because the government was the 'speaker,' and the role of the clinic physicians
was merely to transmit the government's message."); Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination,
24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 137 (1996) ("The Supreme Court in Rosenberger ...
distinguished Rust v. Sullivan ... as a case concerned only with the government's speech.");
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Parades, Public Squares and Voucher Payments: Problems of Government
Neutrality, 28 CONN. L. REv. 243, 257 n.68 (1996) ("Justice Kennedy in Rosenberger interprets
Rust to have permitted even viewpoint discrimination so long as it takes place in the context of
government speech-either directly or through a private agent."); Yvette Marie Barksdale, And
the Poor Have Children: A Harm-Based Analysis of Family Caps and the Hollow Procreative
Rights of Welfare Beneficiaries, 14 L. & INEQ. 1, 25 n.89 (1995) ("The Court in Rosenberger
attempted to distinguish Rust on the ground that in Rust the government was subsidizing speech
to promote its own point of view and therefore could make content based restrictions.").
47. Daniel W. Park, Government Speech and the Public Forum: A Clash Between
Democratic and Egalitarian Values, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 113, 125 (2010) ("What made Rust
significant was that the agents were not government employees but private clinics that merely
received money from the government.").
48. Cf Lee, supra note 38, at 1050 ("[N]othing in the regulations required the doctors to
disclose the government's role in restricting the scope of their counseling.").
49. Cf Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695,
709 (2011) ("So long as government's use of these mechanisms is transparent, any harm to the
market may be minimized-people can identify the government's voice and, if they disagree with
its message, vote out the governmental actors responsible.").
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without articulated criteria,50 and the remedy the electorate possesses-
voting in a new government5 1 -cannot be effective when the electorate
does not even know that the disapproved speech comes from the
government rather than a private party.
B. Government as Stealth Speaker
The possibility that the government would speak without identifying
itself as the speaker was again illustrated in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing
52Association. In that case, the constitutionality of a requirement that
certain meat producers contribute monies to a beef promotion campaign
was at issue. The challengers did not want to support the generic campaign
promoting beef consumption because they believed such a program
undermined their attempts to establish the superiority of their beef products
in particular.53
The Court explained that it had "sustained First Amendment
challenges to allegedly compelled expression . .. [where] an individual is
required by the government to subsidize a message he disagrees with,
expressed by a private entity," although the Court had "not ... considered
the First Amendment consequences of government-compelled subsidy of
the government's own speech." But to frame the issue this way was to
resolve it. "'Compelled support of government'-even those programs of
government one does not approve-is of course perfectly constitutional, as
every taxpayer must attest. And some government programs involve, or
entirely consist of, advocating a position." 54
The Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985 required the Secretary
of Agriculture "to appoint a Cattlemen's Beef Promotion and Research
Board."5 5 Monies would be raised "to fund beef-related projects, including
promotional campaigns" 56 by "impos[ing] a $1-per-head assessment (or
50. Bezanson & Buss, supra note 37, at 1442 ("If government may be treated as a First
Amendment speaker, virtually every regulatory act of government could be transformed into an
act of government expression, and then sheltered from attack under the shield of the First
Amendment.").
51. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
52. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
53. Id. at 556 ("Respondents noted that the advertising promotes beef as a generic
commodity, which, they contended, impedes their efforts to promote the superiority of, inter alia,
American beef, grain-fed beef, or certified Angus or Hereford beef.").
54. Id. at 559.
55. Id. at 553.
56. Id. at 554.
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'checkoff) on all sales or importation of cattle and a comparable
assessment on imported beef products."5 1
Most, but not all, of the promotional messages would "bear the
attribution 'Funded by America's Beef Producers,'"5 8 which might lead
consumers to believe that a private group, rather than the government, was
behind the advertising.59 While it is true that consumers willing to do some
research might have been able to learn who was behind the advertising,6 0
there would have been nothing to alert anyone that such research was
necessary.61
The Johanns Court made clear that the government's control over the
message was dispositive. "When, as here, the government sets the overall
message to be communicated and approves every word that is
disseminated, it is not precluded from relying on the government-speech
doctrine merely because it solicits assistance from nongovernmental
sources in developing specific messages." 62 But if the fact of control is a
sufficient condition and there is no additional requirement that non-insiders
know that the speech is the government's, then the check on government
speech that is provided by potential electoral backlash is, at the very least,
weakened.63
In his dissent, Justice Souter suggested that "a compelled subsidy
should not be justifiable by [claiming that the support is for government]
speech unless the government . .. put[s] that speech forward as its own.""
57. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 554 (2005) (citing 7 U.S.C. §
2904(8)).
58. Id. at 555.
59. Rita Cain, Uncle Sam Wants You - To Eat Beef?, 11 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 165, 165
(2006) ("Consumers might be surprised to discover that ads touting 'Beef, it's what's for dinner'
actually are messages from the federal government, rather than the beef industry."). But see
Edward L. Carter et al., "Executing the Powers with Which It Is Intrusted": Justifications,
Definitions and Limitations of Government Speech, 14 COMM. L. & POL'Y 453, 470 (2009)
("[T]he Supreme Court noted that the factual question of whether consumers would attribute the
advertisements to private beef producers or the government could not be considered in the facial
challenge and would instead have to be brought in an as-applied challenge."). See also Johanns,
544 U.S. at 565 ("On some set of facts, this second theory might (again, we express no view on
the point) form the basis for an as-applied challenge-if it were established, that is, that
individual beef advertisements were attributed to respondents.").
60. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 579 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[A] taxpayer could discover the
facts by looking hard enough .... ).
61. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[B]ut what would tip off the taxpayer to look?").
62. Id. at 562.
63. See Helen Norton, Government Speech and Political Courage, 68 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 61 (2015) ("[T]he public can only hold government accountable for its expressive
choices when the public can attribute contested speech to the government.").
64. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 571 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).
45
He feared that, "[o]therwise[,] there is no check whatever [sic] on
government's power to compel special speech subsidies" 65 and noted that
"the ads [were] not required to show any sign of being speech by the
Government, and experience under the Act demonstrate[d] how effectively
the Government ha[d] masked its role in producing the ads." 66 justice
Souter observed that those seeing the ads "would most naturally think that
ads urging people to have beef for dinner were placed and paid for by the
beef producers who stand to profit when beef is on the table." 67
While Justice Souter's focus was on whether those objecting to the
speech should be forced to subsidize it, Justice Ginsburg took a differing
approach when rejecting that "the familiar trademarked slogan 'Beef. It's
What's for Dinner[]"' 68 was appropriately characterized as government
speech. She noted that a government agency had publicly recommended
reducing beef intake,6 9 so imputing the pro-beef message to the government
would have undermined one of the government's own positions.
Commentators can debate whether forcing the government to publicly
identify its own speech would be good as a matter of public policy.70 Such
a requirement might undermine the efficacy of the government's message,
e.g., in situations or among groups where the government is not viewed as
particularly credible or trustworthy.7  In any event, the Court has
consistently refused to hold that the government speech doctrine is only
triggered when the government takes ownership of its speech.72
The Court has had opportunities to clarify the government speech
doctrine and instead has only made it more opaque. Consider the Pleasant
Grove City, Utah v. Summum 73 resolution that further complicated the
doctrine. At issue was the refusal of Pleasant Grove City to accept a
65. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
66. Id at 577 (Souter, J., dissenting).
67. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 554.
69. Id. at 569-70 (Ginsburg concurring in the judgment).
70. See Norton, supra note 63, at 62 ("[T]the Court should instead require a government
entity that asserts the government speech defense to establish that it expressly claimed the speech
as its own when it initially authorized the communication.").
71. Cf Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression's
Source, 88 B.U. L. REv. 587, 592-93 (2008) ("Because speakers perceived as unpopular and/or
unreliable will have more difficulty persuading listeners, they may be wise to seek the imprimatur
of more trustworthy sources, which may include the government.").
72. Helen Norton & Danielle Keats Citron, Government Speech 2.0, 87 DENV. U. L. REV.
899, 901-02 (2010) ("In none of these decisions has the Court required government to identify
itself publicly as the source of a contested message to satisfy the government speech defense to a
First Amendment claim.").
73. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
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donation of a stone monument containing the Seven Aphorisms of
Summum for installation in Pioneer Park.74 The park already contained
several other monuments, including one of the Ten Commandments.76
Summum, a religious organization,77 wanted to donate a monument
spelling out its basic beliefs, which would "be similar in size and nature to
the Ten Commandments monument."78  On three separate occasions, the
president of Summum wrote a letter to the town council expressing the
organization's desire to donate the monument, but the offer was rejected
each time.79
There was some difficulty in figuring out the best legal approach to
the issue presented in Summum. Parks are traditional public fora,80 so it
might seem that the city's willingness to open up the park to certain kinds
of expression-as manifested through accepted donations-would obligate
the city to accept other donations representing differing points of view.8 '
But prohibiting a city from refusing donations representing differing
viewpoints would prove unworkable, because "public parks can
accommodate only a limited number of permanent monuments."82 As the
Summum Court noted, "The obvious truth of the matter is that if public
parks were considered to be traditional public forums for the purpose of
erecting privately donated monuments, most parks would have little choice
but to refuse all such donations." 83
The Court began its analysis by pointing out that the "Free Speech
Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not
regulate government speech." 84 The Court explained that "monuments that
are accepted .. . are meant to convey and have the effect of conveying a
74. Id. at464-65.
75. Id. at 465 ("These include an historic granary, a wishing well, the City's first fire
station, a September 11 monument. . . .").
76. Id. ("Th[is] include[s] ... a Ten Commandments monument donated by the Fraternal
Order of Eagles in 1971.").
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 465-66 (2009).
80. Id. at 464 ("[A] park is a traditional public forum.").
81. See id. at 469 ("[G]ovemment entities are strictly limited in their ability to regulate
private speech in such 'traditional public fora."') (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense &
Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)); see also id. ("[A]ny restriction based on the content of
the speech must satisfy strict scrutiny, that is, the restriction must be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest.") (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800); id. ("[R]estrictions based
on viewpoint are prohibited.") (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 463 (1980)).
82. Id. at 478.
83. Id. at 480.
84. Id. at 467 (citing Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005)).
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government message, and they thus constitute government speech."85
Because the monument was government speech, the government was not
required to adopt a position of neutrality with respect to the message
conveyed; instead, the only restriction on the government was that it could
not violate Establishment Clause guarantees. 6
What was the message at issue? The Summum Court spent much time
discussing the content of the messages conveyed by monuments, rejecting
both that "a monument can convey only one 'message'-which is,
presumably, the message intended by the donor"87 and that "if a
government entity that accepts a monument for placement on its property
does not formally embrace that message [i.e., the donor's message], then
the government has not engaged in expressive conduct."88 For example,
even if a donation of a Ten Commandments monument was intended by the
donor to communicate a religious message, such a monument in a park
need not communicate that same message.
After noting that the message a government wishes to convey need not
coincide with the message the donor wishes to convey, the Court then
explained that determining a monument's message may be no easy task.
"The meaning conveyed by a monument is generally not a simple one like
'Beef. It's What's for Dinner."'89 Not only might the message not be a
simple one, but there might be no single (simple or complex) message
conveyed by the monument. For example, what "is 'the message' of the
Greco-Roman mosaic of the word 'Imagine' that was donated to New
York City's Central Park in memory of John Lennon?"" By the same
token, one might ask, "what is 'the message' of the 'large bronze statue
displaying the word "peace" in many world languages' that is displayed in
Fayetteville, Arkansas?"9 '
In addition to the difficulties associated with discerning the message
of a monument at the time of its installation, further difficulties are posed
because the "message that a government entity conveys by allowing a
monument to remain on its property may also be altered by the subsequent
addition of other monuments in the same vicinity." 92 The Court's point is
well-taken that subsequent actions might affect or alter a message.
85. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009).
86. Id. at 460-41 ("[G]overnment speech must comport with the Establishment Clause.").
87. Id. at 474.
88. Id.
89. Id. (citing Johanns, 544 U.S. at 554).
90. Id. at 474.
91. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 475 (2009).
92. Id. at 477.
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However, the Court might also have considered whether the refusal to
accept an additional religious monument might itself alter a previous
message of non-endorsement of religion to one of endorsement.93
The focus here is not on whether Establishment Clause guarantees
were violated by refusing the Summum monument, 9 4 but simply on the
criteria used by the Court to determine that the government speech doctrine
was triggered. The Summum Court implied that it was often difficult to
determine the content of the government's message when monuments
installed in public parks were at issue, so it seems hard to imagine that the
government exercised control of the message itself.
In Summum, the governmental control was over which monuments
were installed9 5 in a park owned and managed by the City. 9 6 But the Court
itself illustrated why ownership and maintenance of a monument should
not be conflated with controlling the monument's message. 97 Indeed, the
respondent had complained that the City had not adequately controlled the
message conveyed by the Ten Commandments.98 Instead, in Summum,
"the City has 'effectively controlled' the messages sent by the monuments
in the Park by exercising 'final approval authority' over their selection." 99
But the final approval did not go into deciding what the content would be;
instead, the approval was simply about which monuments were selected for
installation.
Consider how this criterion might be used in other context in which
the state must decide between competing entries. In National Endowment
for the Arts v. Finley, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a
requirement that the "Chairperson of the National Endowment for the Arts
93. Patrick M. Garry, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum: The Supreme Court Finds a Public
Display of the Ten Commandments to Be Permissible Government Speech, 2009 CATO SUP. CT.
REv. 271, 285 (2008-2009) ("Such a refusal might be judged under the endorsement test to
convey to the reasonable observer a message of establishment of the religion (or religions)
associated with the Ten Commandments.").
94. Mary Jean Dolan, Why Monuments Are Government Speech: The Hard Case of Pleasant
Grove City v. Summum, 58 CATH. U. L. REv. 7, 49 (2008) ("Pleasant Grove's continued display
of the Ten Commandments-in juxtaposition with its refusal to display the monument offered by
a small religion-arguably sends a message of exclusion.").
95. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 472 ("[T]he City decided to accept those donations and to
display them in the Park.").
96. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 473-74 (2009) ("[T]he City took
ownership of that monument and put it on permanent display in a park that it owns and manages
and that is linked to the City's identity.").
97. Id. at 474-75.
98. Id. at 473 ("[R]espondent argues that Pleasant Grove City has not adequately
'controll[ed] the message' of the Ten Commandments monument.") (citing Brief for Respondent
at 31).
99. Id. (citing Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 560-61 (2005)).
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(NEA) ... ensure that 'artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria
by which [grant] applications are judged, taking into consideration general
standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the
American public."' 0 0 The respondents claimed that the decency and
respect requirement was "impermissibly viewpoint based,"'0 ' because that
requirement had been adopted to decrease the likelihood that artwork with
certain kinds of contents would receive government funding.1 0 2
The Court upheld the restriction because it did not perceive a "realistic
danger that [Section] 954(d)(1) will compromise First Amendment
values." 0 3  In contrast, Justice Scalia argued that the requirement
"establishes content- and viewpoint-based criteria upon which grant
applications are to be evaluated," 10 although he believed the restriction
was constitutional.105 In his view, the government had absolute discretion
with respect to what it chose to fund. 06
Summum suggests how Finley could have been decided using a
different approach. Because the NEA would have "'effectively controlled'
the messages [over the competing entries] . . . by exercising 'final approval
authority' over their selection,"'0 7 the chosen entries might have been
viewed as government speech. The claim here is not that the Finley Court
adopted the final approval authority approach-on the contrary, the Finley
Court rejected that the government regulation would "give rise to the
suppression of protected expression,"'0 8 and instead argued that "[a]ny
content-based considerations that may be taken into account in the grant-
100. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 572 (1998) (citing 20 U.S.C. §
954(d)(1) (2014)).
101. Id at 578.
102. Cf id. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). ("It is evident in the legislative
history that § 954(d)(1) was prompted by, and directed at, the public funding of such offensive
productions as Serrano's 'Piss Christ,' the portrayal of a crucifix immersed in urine, and
Mapplethorpe's show of lurid homoerotic photographs.")
103. Id. at 583.
104. Id. at 590 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
105. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[T]hat is perfectly constitutional.").
106. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 599 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) ("The Government, I think, may allocate both competitive and
noncompetitive funding ad libitum, insofar as the First Amendment is concerned."); see Mark P.
McKenna, Intellectual Property, Privatization and Democracy: A Response to Professor Rose, 50
ST. Louis U. L.J. 829, 837 (2006) ("As Justice Scalia noted in a recent speech about government
funding of the arts, it has long been the case that 'he who pays the piper calls the tune."').
107. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 473 (2009) (citing Johanns v.
Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 560-61 (2005)).
108. Finley, 524 U.S. at 585.
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making process are a consequence of the nature of arts funding."' 09 By
analyzing why the regulation did not offend First Amendment guarantees
rather than whether First Amendment guarantees had been triggered, the
Court was eschewing a government speech approach. Nonetheless, one
might wonder whether the Court will someday retroactively declare Finley
a government speech case just as the Rosenberger Court retroactively
declared Rust a government speech case." 0
Johanns suggests that government control of the message suffices to
make expression government speech,"' and Summum suggests that
expression might constitute government speech, if government ultimately
decides which expression will be represented.1 2  These are two very
different approaches to deciding when expression should be characterized
as government speech, and the most recent government speech case did
little to clarify the underlying jurisprudence.
In Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., the
Court examined a refusal by the Texas Department of Voter Vehicles
Board to authorize a license plate design proposed by the Sons of
Confederate Veterans ("SCV").11 3  Texas makes a variety of kinds of
license plates available. For example, there are "the State's general-issue
license plates,"ll 4 which contain "the word 'Texas,' a license plate number,
a silhouette of the State, a graphic of the Lone Star, and the slogan 'The
Lone Star State."' 5  Or, a driver might create a specialty plate, which
"contains the word 'Texas,' a license plate number, and one of a selection
of designs prepared by the State."" 6 Included among the specialty plate
options was a process whereby a nonprofit organization would submit "a
draft design of the specialty license plate,"" 7 which the Board could reject
"for a number of reasons, for example 'if the design might be offensive to
any member of the public . . . or for any other reason established by
rule.'" 18
109. Id.
110. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
111. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562.
112. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 473.
113. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2243-44
(2015) ("[T]he Texas Division of the Sons of Confederate Veterans proposed a specialty license
plate design featuring a Confederate battle flag. The Board rejected the proposal.").
114. Id. at 2244.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. (citing 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 217.45(i)(2)(C)).
118. Id. at 2245 (citing TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 504.801(c)).
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The Board rejected the proposed design of the SCV, which would
have included the Confederate flag on the plate."1 9 SCV sued, claiming a
violation of First Amendment guarantees.120
The Walker Court held that "specialty license plates issued pursuant to
Texas's statutory scheme convey government speech,"121 offering
"reasoning rest[ing] primarily on ... [the] analysis in Summum.1 2 2  The
Court discussed three factors mentioned in Summum: (1) a history of using
the contested object as a means of communicating with the public;1 23 (2) a
common understanding that messages conveyed by objects on property can
be associated with the owners of that property; 2 4 and (3) the fact that
governmental unit had control over which objects were selected for
inclusion.1 2 5  The Court did not discuss whether the presence of any of
these factors was necessary for a finding that particular expression was
government speech, although the Court implied that satisfying all of those
factors would suffice to establish a claim of government speech.
The Walker Court then applied these criteria to license plates, noting:
(1) "the history of license plates shows that, insofar as license plates have
conveyed more than state names and vehicle identification numbers, they
long have communicated messages from the States;" 26 (2) Texas license
plate designs "are often closely identified in the public mind with the
119. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (2015)
At the bottom of the proposed plate were the words "SONS OF CONFEDERATE VETERANS."
At the side was the organization's logo, a square Confederate battle flag framed by the words
"Sons of Confederate Veterans 1896." A faint Confederate battle flag appeared in the
background on the lower portion of the plate. Additionally, in the middle of the plate was the
license plate number, and at the top was the State's name and silhouette.
120. Id. ("In 2012, [Sons of Confederate Veterans] and two of its officers (collectively SCV)
brought this lawsuit against the chairman and members of the Board (collectively Board). SCV
argued that the Board's decision violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.").
121. Id. at 2246.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2247 ("[H]istory shows that '[g]overnments have long used monuments to speak
to the public."') (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009)).
124. Id. ("[I]t 'is not common for property owners to open up their property for the
installation of permanent monuments that convey a message with which they do not wish to be
associated.' As a result, 'persons who observe donated monuments routinely-and reasonably-
interpret them as conveying some message on the property owner's behalf."') (citing Summum,
555 U.S. at 471).
125. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2247 (2015)
("[W]e found relevant the fact that the city maintained control over the selection of
monuments .... And we observed that the city government in Summum 'effectively controlled'
the messages sent by the monuments in the [p]ark by exercising 'final approval authority' over
their selection.") (citing Summum, 555 U.S. at 473).
126. Id. at 2248.
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[State];" 2 7 and (3) "Texas maintains direct control over the messages
conveyed on its specialty plates." 2 8 Indeed, the Court hypothesized that
everyone understood that the license plate suggested state involvement.
"[A] person who displays a message on a Texas license plate likely intends
to convey to the public that the State has endorsed that message." 2 9
Otherwise, "the individual could simply display the message in question in
larger letters on a bumper sticker right next to the plate."'30 Further, Texas
had "direct control over the messages conveyed on its specialty plates,"'3 '
if only because the "Board must approve every specialty plate design
proposal before the design can appear on a Texas plate."' 32
Justice Alito suggested in his dissent that an individual who saw
license plates supporting football rivals of the University of Texas would
be unlikely to believe that "the State of Texas was officially (and perhaps
treasonously) rooting for the Longhorns' opponents."' 3 3 He thus cast doubt
on whether it was reasonable to believe that the state endorsed the license
plate messages, which undercut that the second factor had been met.
While Justice Alito is correct that individual onlookers would likely
attribute a message supporting the University of Southern California to a
private party rather than the state, that point is not dispositive. Johanns
suggests that the viewers' beliefs about who is sponsoring a message need
not undermine that particular expression is government speech. Indeed, the
government can identify particular expressions as its own even if those
expressions communicate contradictory messages, e.g., people should both
increase and decrease their beef consumption. The government can send a
multitude of messages as its own.134 While the Court in both Walker and
Summum argued that the three factors supported the conclusion that the
expression at issue was government speech, the Court never suggested that
the previous government speech cases (where all three factors were not
met) were wrongly decided. But that means that those wishing to
understand and formulate the government speech jurisprudence cannot
simply look at Summum and Walker. They must also look at Rust and
127. Id. (citing Summum, 555 U.S. at 472).
128. Id. at 2249.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2249 (2015).
132. Id. (citing 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 217.45(i)(7)-(8), 217.52(b) (2016)).
133. Id. at 2255 (Alito, J., dissenting).
134. See Wright, supra note 14, at 353-54 ("That the state wishes to convey many, perhaps
hundreds, of governmental messages through its specialty license plate program also does not
establish that the various messages are not government speech.").
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Johanns, when discussing the criteria that must be met before particular
expression can be classified as government speech.
II. Government Speech in the Circuits
The Court's refusal to offer clear criteria by which to determine
whether the government is acting as speaker, rather than regulator, has put
the circuit courts in a difficult position. Some apply the Summum factors,
even though the Court has found government speech in cases where those
factors have not been met. Others have followed the Court's lead, thereby
making clearer some of the undesirable implications of the Court's current
jurisprudence.
A. Tam
In In re Tam, the Federal Circuit examined a challenge to a refusal by
the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") to register the name "The
Slants."'3 5 The Lanham Act prohibits the PTO from "registering
scandalous, immoral, or disparaging marks."' 3 6 Mr. Tam had chosen that
name for the band not because he wished to disparage but because he
wanted to affirm his pride in being Asian.1 3 7 Nonetheless, the Board had
found that "the mark is disparaging to a substantial composite of people of
Asian descent."' 3 8
Much of the Tam opinion discussed why the "disparagement
provision"'39 involved viewpoint discrimination and did not pass muster
under strict scrutiny. 140 Yet, a more basic question was whether First
Amendment speech protections were even triggered, to which the
government had argued that "trademark registration is government speech,
and as such outside the coverage of the First Amendment."' 4 1 The court
then set out to show why "there [was] no government speech at issue in the
135. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1331-32 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("The Board affirmed the
examiner's refusal to register the mark."), cert. granted, Lee v. Tam, 2016 WL 1587871 (U.S.
Sept. 29, 2016) (No. 15-1293).
136. Id. at 1327 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006)).
137. Id. at 1332 (noting that the band's Wikipedia entry quoted Tam as saying: "We want to
take on these stereotypes that people have about us, like the slanted eyes, and own them. We're
very proud of being Asian-we're not going to hide that fact. The reaction from the Asian
community has been positive.")
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1336.
140. See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1334.
141. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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rejection of disparaging trademark registrations that would insulate
[Section] 2(a) from First Amendment review." 42
The Federal Circuit made a number of points, for example, that there
"is simply no meaningful basis for finding that consumers associate
registered private trademarks with the government," 4 3 and that "the PTO
routinely registers marks that no one can say the government endorses." 4 4
Those points are well-taken, although Justice Alito had basically suggested
in his Walker dissent that no one would associate with the state of Texas
various messages contained on the license plates.1 4 5  However, Justice
Alito's argument did not win the day in Walker, and there was no
suggestion that the Walker majority believed that "the State of Texas was
officially (and perhaps treasonously) rooting for the Longhorns'
opponents." 4 6 Further, those seeing the advertisement "Beef. It's What's
for Dinner[]" would likely have associated that message with private beef
producers rather than the government,1 4 7 but that did not preclude the
advertisement from being government speech.
The Tam court suggested that "the PTO's processing of trademark
registrations no more transforms private speech into government speech
than when the government issues permits for street parades, copyright
registration certificates, or, for that matter, grants medical, hunting, fishing,
or drivers licenses." 4 8 Yet, the PTO does not merely process trademark
applications; it also makes a judgment about which marks are scandalous
and which are not,14 9 which means that the registering of the trademark
might be taken to imply tacit endorsement.150 In addition, the PTO makes a
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1346.
144. Id.
145. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
146. See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2255
(2015) (Alito, J., dissenting).
147. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
148. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
149. M. Christopher Bolen, et al., When Scandal Becomes Vogue: The Registrability of
Sexual References in Trademarks and Protection of Trademarks from Tarnishment in Sexual
Contexts, 39 IDEA 435, 436 (1999) (Section 2(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act permits the
United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") to refuse registration of any mark that
'consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter."').
150. Todd Anten, Self-Disparaging Trademarks and Social Change: Factoring the
Reappropriation of Slurs into Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 388, 397
(2006) ("[F]ederal registration may also provide intangible psychological benefits to a trademark
holder through the government's implicit approval of the mark."); Anne Gilson LaLonde &
Jerome Gilson, Trademarks Laid Bare: Marks That May Be Scandalous or Immoral, 101
TRADEMARK REP. 1476, 1484 (2011) (discussing the view that permitting registration of a
trademark suggests that the government is giving its stamp of approval); Stephen R. Baird, Moral
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decision about whether a mark is sufficiently distinctive.' 51 In any event,
the PTO controls who receives trademark protection and who does not, and
the Summum Court suggested that the government's control over who is
selected was itself an important if not dispositive element in establishing
government speech.1 52
There is something appealing in the Tam court's assertion that
expression is not transformed into government speech merely because the
government issues a permit, but part of that appeal may be based on the
assumption that issuing the permit is merely ministerial 5 3 and does not
involve the government's making judgments about the worthiness of the
expression. It is fair to suggest that the government's issuing a permit
should not be thought equivalent to embracing the content of a message,
but Summum makes clear that the government may be speaking even when
the content of its speech does not match the content of a private speaker's
expression.154
The Tam court worried that its agreeing with the government that
permitting registration of a trademark amounted to government speech had
the potential to "transform every act of government registration into one of
government speech and thus allow rampant viewpoint discrimination." 55
That would depend upon whether other types of registration might also be
thought to carry some sort of government imprimatur. For example, where
permits to engage in expressive activities are handed out on a first-come,
Intervention in the Trademark Arena: Banning the Registration of Scandalous and Immoral
Trademarks, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 661, 663 n.6 (1993) (discussing "the Board's previously stated
contention in McGinley that a federal trademark registration suggests the government's implied
approval of the owner's use of the mark"). See also Timothy R. Holbrook, The Expressive
Impact of Patents, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 573, 577 (2006) ("[T]he signal from a patent is
necessarily intermingled with expressions of the government's approval.").
151. Terry Ann Smith, Telephone Numbers That Spell Generic Terms: A Protectable
Trademark or an Invitation to Monopolize A Market?, 28 U.S.F. L. Rev. 1079, 1087 (1994)
("Once the [Patent and Trademark Office] or a court determines that a mark is distinctive enough
to be capable of protection, the Lanham Act dictates that likelihood of consumer confusion, due
to the similarity of the marks, shall then be the main focus when evaluating whether the mark
should be granted trademark protection.").
152. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
153. Starter v. United States, 66 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1933) ("According to the weight of
authority, the legal definition of a ministerial act is an act that is mandatory upon an officer under
given circumstances, and calls for the exercise of no judgment or discretion on the part of such
officer.").
154. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
155. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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first-served basis,' 56 there will be no presumed endorsement of the
message.
The Tam court considered the three factors discussed in Walker: (1)
license plates have historically been viewed as communicating a
government message;' 57 (2) license plates are closely identified in the
public mind with the government;' 58 and (3) the state exercised control over
the plates,1 5 9 thus concluding that Walker had no application to the case
before the court.' 60  Yet, permitting a trademark to be registered
communicates, at the very least, that the government does not believe that
the trademark falls into a prohibited category. Further, the public might
well associate trademark registration and enforcement with the
government,16' and the government decides (controls) whether the
trademark can be registered.1 62
Suppose, however, that all three factors are not met. The Court has
never indicated that the failure to meet one of the factors would prevent
expression from being treated as government speech. Nor could the Court
hold such a position unless it were willing to overrule some of the previous
government speech cases. Medical advice given at private clinics would
hardly be associated with the government; nor would commercials
extolling the benefits of having beef for dinner.
The Tam court quite sensibly worried that were it to accept the
government's claim that trademark registration amounted to government
speech, then there would be no apparent stopping point at which the
government could be barred from making such a claim. Yet, the criteria for
determining whether expression is government speech implicitly or
156. See Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Port of Portland, 172 F. App'x 760, 764 (9th Cir. 2006)
("Permits will be assigned on a first-come, first-served basis, and the permitting official is not
given any discretion in the decision.").
157. Tam, 808 F.3d at 1346 (citing Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2239, 2248 (2015)).
158. Id. (citing Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248).
159. Id. (citing Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249).
160. Id. ("The government's argument in this case that trademark registration amounts to
government speech is at odds with the Supreme Court's analysis in Walker and unmoored from
the very concept of government speech.").
161. See Gwendolyn Gill, Through the Back Door: Attempts to Use Trade Dress to Protect
Expired Patents, 67 U. CIN. L. REv. 1269 (1999) ("In providing trademark protection, the federal
government grants an essentially indefinite monopoly to a person or business for the use of a
trademark-a word, phrase, design, or symbol-that identifies the origin of the product with
which the trademark is associated.").
162. Cf Daniel Lifschitz, The ACTA Boondoggle: When IP Harmonization Bites Off More
Than It Can Chew, 34 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 197, 216 (2011) (discussing "what
motivates the government to grant exclusive controls over them [patents, copyrights and
trademarks]").
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explicitly endorsed by the Tam court do not account for those cases in
which government speech has been recognized, making the requirement
that these criteria be met seem ad hoc.
B. Tennyson
Does the government speech jurisprudence open the door to viewpoint
discrimination? Consider American Civil Liberties Union of North
Carolina v. Tennyson.1 63 North Carolina permits drivers to choose a pro-
life license plate but does not permit them to choose a pro-choice license
plate.' The Fourth Circuit had previously held that such a policy violates
First Amendment guarantees.' 6 5 However, that decision had been vacated
and remanded by the United States Supreme Court for consideration in
light of Walker.166 Unsurprisingly, upon reconsideration, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that "specialty license plates issued under North Carolina's
program amount to government speech and that North Carolina is therefore
free to reject license plate designs that convey messages with which it
disagrees. 167
There may be a whole host of issues about which the government will
want to take sides, which will mean that license plates may become the
forum in which government will permit certain, but not other, messages to
be articulated. To make matters even more complicated, license plates
proclaiming the "correct" message under one administration may be
deemed to be proclaiming a disfavored message if a different party gains
control of the government. It remains to be seen whether, for example,
individuals will be required to get new plates if a previously approved
message should become disfavored.
Government speech is by no means limited to license plates or
monuments in parks, and contentious issues include, but are not limited to,
discussions of abortion or matters involving race or the Civil War. As
Tennyson illustrates, the government speech doctrine may well be invoked
163. ACLU ofN.C. v. Tennyson, 815 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2016).
164. Id. at 184 ("North Carolina operates a specialty license plate program that offers ... a
'Choose Life' plate, but the State has repeatedly rejected efforts to include a pro-choice license
plate.").
165. Id. ("In our previous opinion in this case, we affirmed the decision of the district court
and held that North Carolina's specialty license plate program violated the First Amendment.")
(citing ACLU v. Tata, 742 F.3d 563 (4th Cir. 2014)).
166. Id. ("The State sought review by the Supreme Court, which vacated our decision and
remanded the case to us for reconsideration in light of the Court's decision in Walker v. Texas
Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.").
167. Id. at 185 (citing Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2239, 2245 (2015)).
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to justify the government's offering a favored position (or, perhaps,
precluding the expression of a disfavored position) on a variety of topics in
a variety of settings. Thus far, the Court has not offered helpful constraints
on when the government can claim speech as its own, so it remains to be
seen how the doctrine will be cabined.
Conclusion
Tam and Tennyson illustrate the positions the circuit courts will likely
take when confronted with government speech claims. Some of the circuits
will accept the claims, if only because the Court has not imposed
meaningful restrictions on when the government can claim expression as its
own, while other courts will attempt to impose meaningful restrictions on
when the government can avoid First Amendment speech restrictions by
claiming expression as its own. Precisely because the circuits will be
adopting different approaches to claims that certain expression constitutes
government speech and thus is not subject to First Amendment limitations,
relevantly similar cases will be decided differently in different circuits, at
least until the United States Supreme Court offers much more guidance
with respect to which expression is properly classified as government
speech.
The Court in Summum and Walker discussed and applied three factors,
but neither decision says, or even implies, that those factors must be met
before the government can claim speech as its own. Indeed, the
government speech cases prior to Summum would presumably have been
decided differently in light of those factors, and the Court has nowhere
suggested that Rust and Johanns were incorrectly analyzed as government
speech cases.
The Court has never required that the government identify its own
speech or that the public know which speech is the government's, perhaps
out of the belief that forcing the government to label its own speech might
undercut the effectiveness of that speech or other speech that the
government also wishes to make. But the two different ways to establish
that expression is government speech-either the government controls the
content of the message or controls which expressions are chosen for some
special purpose-give the government an easy way to avoid First
Amendment speech limitations.
Until the Court offers clear factors limiting the conditions under which
the government can claim that expression is government speech, the
government will likely be tempted to classify more and more expression as
government speech. Doing so might yield great benefits to the
government, because constitutional constraints will have been nullified,
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and the political costs might be negligible, if only because the public might
not even know that the government was speaking. But this will mean that
there may be more and more contexts in which there will be no
marketplace of ideas and the public will be denied the benefits that might
accrue when contrasting positions are included in discussions of matters of
public import. In short, the Court has used an undefined category to
dispose of cases without offering any helpful ways to prevent that category
from eviscerating First Amendment guarantees. The Court must act
quickly to fill the void that it has created; or else, the very speech
guarantees that the Court must apply may be undermined beyond repair.
